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THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

TRAVIS L. BOWEN,
Appellant/Petitioner

Supreme Court Case No. 20060950

vs.

OPC No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0628, 050448

UTAH STATE BAR,
Appellee/Respondent

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Ethics and Discipline
Committee of the Utah Supreme Court concerning that committee's decision in In re
Travis Bowen, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law, and Recommendation of Discipline:
Public Reprimand, Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0628, 05-0448 (March 1, 2006). The
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to Article VIII, section 4 of the Utah
Constitution. In re Discipline of Harding, 2004 UT 100, \ 11, 104 P.3d 1220.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order
of public reprimand issued by the Utah State Bar?
Issue 2: Should the Supreme Court void an order of public discipline where a
member of the committee recommending the discipline has a conflict of interest that
would almost certainly require a similarly situated judge to recuse herself?
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Issue 3: Who bears the burden of discovering and disclosing Committee member
conflicts of interest in a disciplinary proceeding?
Standards of Review: Attorney discipline cases come before the Supreme Court
as matters of original jurisdiction and are reviewed in that light. Harding, 2004 UT f 11.
The Supreme Court has "no obligation to defer to the conclusions of any other body."
Id., % 12.

Statement of grounds for seeking review of issue not preserved in trial court:
Petitioner was not aware of the conflict of interest until after this matter was heard before
the Ethics and Discipline Committee, therefore petitioner was not required to preserve the
conflict issue for appeal on the record.
OPINION BELOW
The opinion under review is In re Travis Bow en, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand, Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433,
05-0628, 05-0448 (March 1, 2006), Addendum 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of the following relevant statutes and rules is reproduced in Addendum 6:
Utah Const, art. VIII § 4
Utah Code Ann. §78-7-1
ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule I.2.F (2002)
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)
Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.7
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Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 14-503 (also "Rule 3")
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 14-510 (also "Rule 10")
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 14-511 (also "Rule 11")
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 14-513 (also "Rule 13")
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 1, 2006, a screening panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of
the Utah Supreme Court (the "screening panel") made findings of fact and conclusions of
law determining that Petitioner had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The
screening panel issued a recommendation that Travis L. Bowen receive a public
reprimand. Mr. Bowen completed an exception to that recommendation. On June 30,
2006, the Chair of the Committee issued an Order of Discipline for Mr. Bowen.
One screening panel member was, and still is, a partner in a law firm that was
representing the plaintiff in Neffv. Neff, a million dollar lawsuit against multiple
defendants, including Mr. Bowen. This screening panel member did not disclose her law
firm's conflict of interest during the disciplinary proceedings.
Petitioner sought judicial intervention from the Third District Court, State of Utah,
requesting an order against the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar,
staying the publication of the reprimand. The OPC moved to dismiss, on the grounds that
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The jurisdictional issues were briefed by
both parties. Prior to the court issuing a ruling, the OPC published the reprimand in the
September-October edition of the Utah State Bar Journal.
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A few days after the Bar Journal was circulated, James Magleby, a partner in the
Magleby & Greenwood, attempted to use the public reprimand as evidence against Mr.
Bowen in the law suit Neffv. Neff.
Given the OPC's publication of the reprimand without waiting for the District
Court's ruling on jurisdiction, Mr. Bowen withdrew his petition. Mr. Bowen now
appeals the findings of the Panel and the Chair's order of discipline on the basis that his
due process rights were violated by the material conflict of interest of a screening panel
member.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over an appeal of public
discipline issued by the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Supreme Court.
Harding, 2001 UT % 11. Though no rule of appellate procedure specifically governs
appeals from the Ethics and Discipline Committee, Article VIII section 4 of the Utah
Constitution indicates that the Supreme Court must maintain the power to review all
attorney discipline in the State of Utah. Petitioner has standing to bring this case.
Point II: Christine Greenwood, a member of the screening panel recommending
that Mr. Bowen receive a public reprimand, is the vice president of Magleby &
Greenwood. Magleby & Greenwood is counsel for plaintiff in Neffv. Neff, case number
030100275, an ongoing, high stakes litigation in the First District Court of Utah, where
Travis Bowen is one of the named defendants. See Addendum 3. Both Utah cases and
advisory rules from the American Bar Association suggest that where such conflicts exist
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and committee members do not recuse themselves, the findings and actions of such
committees are voidable. Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221
(Utah 1985); American Bar Association Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement, Rule I.2.F (2002), reproduced in Addendum 6.
Point III: Attorneys and judges must recuse themselves where they have conflicts
of interest. Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1; Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7.
While no rule explicitly places the burden to discover and disclose conflicts on any
person, it is much more practical to place that burden upon committee members who sit
in judgment of other attorneys.

X

ARGUMENT
A. The Supreme Court Has Jurisdiction To Hear An Appeal Of A Public
Reprimand.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review an order of public reprimand issued
by the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has
exclusive power to govern the practice of law including discipline of attorneys. Utah
Const, art. VIII § 4. The Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court
reviews informal complaints via screening panels and recommends the action to be taken
on any informal complaint. Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 3. After a screening
panel of the Committee recommends that an attorney be publicly reprimanded, the
respondent may file an exception and request a hearing. Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and
Disab. Rule 10. The hearing takes place in front of the Chair of that Committee. Id. The
respondent attorney has the burden of showing that recommendation is unreasonable or
otherwise clearly erroneous. Id. The rules neither provide for nor prohibit an appeal of
the Committee Chair's final order of discipline. The Committee members are members
of the Bar and members of the public. Id., Rule 3. The Supreme Court appoints
Committee members. Id. The Bar is a private corporation and has no authority to
publicly discipline attorneys absent explicit authorization from the Supreme Court.
Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 804 P.2d 526, 529 (Utah 1991). Whenever the Committee
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takes public disciplinary action it does so in a judicial capacity on behalf of the Supreme
Court. Id.; Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab., Rule 13.l
Prior versions of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability explicitly provided
for respondents to appeal an order by the Bar Association. In Re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207
(Utah 1997). In re Babilis concerned the rights of parties to appeal the recommendation
of "the Board/5 which performed essentially the same function the screening panel now
performs. The Court read the prior version of Rule 11(g) as giving parties a right to
appeal recommendations of the Board as well as rulings of the District Court even where
that appeal right was not explicit. In that case the Court used a superseded version of the
Procedures of Discipline which "explicitly permitted both the 'attorney [and] Bar
counsel' to file a formal appeal from the recommendations of the Board to [the Supreme]
Court." Id. at 213. The Court held that both respondent and the Office of Professional
Conduct may appeal a recommendation. Id.
The Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability have undergone further changes
since 1997 when Babilis was decided. At that time RLDD rule 11(g) read, "any order of
public discipline may be appealed to the Supreme Court pursuant to the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure." Id. at 214. The same rule now reads, "Any discipline order by the
district court may be reviewed by the Supreme Court through a petition for review
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The Bar does, in fact, issue orders of public reprimand, but only does so in a judicial
capacity on behalf of the Supreme Court. Petitioner does not dispute that the Bar is
procedurally permitted to do so, but merely argues that because public discipline,
including reprimands, is a function of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court must be
able to review the Bar's actions. A contrary interpretation would be an unconstitutional
relinquishing of authority.
2

pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab.
Rule 11(g) (2003). The rules are silent as to decisions or orders by the Committee Chair
on informal complaints.
One possible interpretation of this revision is that the Supreme Court wanted to
surrender its original jurisdiction of all informal disciplinary proceedings. This cannot be
the correct interpretation under Article VIII of the Utah Constitution. The Court has
emphasized that the role of the Bar in the enforcement of the rules of attorney discipline
is a limited one. Babilis, 951 P.2d at 214. The Bar "has no power to order disbarment,
suspension, public reprimand, or restitution on its own authority''' Barnard, 804 P.2d at
529 (emphasis added). Complete surrender of review authority in informal complaints
does not make sense where the Utah Constitution gives the Supreme Court all power to
regulate attorneys, and the Supreme Court's explicit ruling limits the Bar. The language
of the rules should not be read as foreclosing an attorney's right to Petition the Court for
review of the Committee's order of public reprimand.
A more sensible interpretation of the rule is that there is no question that the
Committee is acting in an official capacity, and is therefore inherently subject to review
by the Supreme Court. If this interpretation is correct, it would be totally unnecessary for
the rules to contain a procedure for appeal to the Supreme Court.
This is not to say the Supreme Court should be required to hear appeals of orders
from the Ethics and Discipline Committee. The Court can and may have chosen not to
create an automatic appeal as of right from an informal disciplinary proceeding resulting
in a public reprimand. This does not mean that the Court cannot exercise its power of
3

discretionary review in a bar discipline case, when it so chooses. The clear due process
violations under the facts of this case beg for a review by this Court.
It is unlikely that the Supreme Court intended to leave the Committee completely
unchecked in issuing public reprimands. Such delegation would likely violate the Utah
Constitution, given the Supreme Court's role in regulating the practice of law. Attorney
discipline cases come before the Supreme Court as matters of original jurisdiction rather
than a traditional appeal. In re Harding, 2004 UTffif11-12, 104 P.3d 1220. Even if the
Supreme Court uses the Bar to collect information and expedite the disciplinary process,
the Court retains plenary powers over attorney discipline. Id.
This court has jurisdiction to review the June 30th order of discipline on the
grounds that Mr. Bowen's due process rights to a fair hearing were violated. Denial of
this appeal would be contrary to the Utah Constitution and would result in substantial
injustice.
B. Petitioner Has Standing To Request Review Of The Committee's
Recommendation.
A person has standing to challenge government action if that person has a concrete
stake in the outcome of the controversy. A plaintiff has sufficient stake in the
controversy if he can show injury in fact, caused by the government, and that the injury
will be remedied by a decision in his favor. See, e.g. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S.
669, 688-690 (1973). Mr. Bowen has been injured by the Bar's actions, and because the
Bar was acting to publicly discipline an attorney, those actions should be deemed state
action. The injury Mr. Bowen suffered could be remedied by a favorable decision from
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this Court. The remedy could include declaring that the reprimand is void, ordering the
Bar to publish a retraction in the next edition of the Bar Journal, or any other relief the
Court finds appropriate.
Even if the Court determines Petitioner's claim is moot, he should be entitled to
challenge the Committee's findings and order because the injury is capable of repetition
yet evading review. In re Discipline of Johnson, 2001 UT 110, % 15, 48 P.3d 881 (Utah
2001). The Bar cannot reasonably take the position that Petitioner's argument is moot
simply because it already published the reprimand. If so, the Bar would be able to
circumvent any challenge to orders of public reprimand, no matter how improper the
procedure, simply by publishing the reprimand.
Mr. Bowen does have standing to challenge the public reprimand because he can
show injury, causation, and redressability, or because the injury is capable of repetition
yet evading review. The Supreme Court unquestionably has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal.

C. The Court Should Void The Public Reprimand And Order The Bar
Association To Publish A Retraction.
Under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a state action resulting in
stigma to a person's reputation plus loss of employment or associational opportunities
should be declared void where the decision is tainted by a biased decision maker. While
all government actions require fair process, what constitutes fair process varies according
to the circumstances of the deprivation. A court should weigh: (1) the importance of the
individual interest; (2) the value of specific procedural safeguards; and (3) the
5

government interest in efficiency. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). As will
be shown, the individual interest here is recognized by courts as important, the procedural
violation alleged is clearly recognized and among the most basic, and government
efficiency is not jeopardized.
First, actions of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court
are state actions. When the Bar acts to enforce the Rules of Professional Conduct, it is
acting as an arm of the Supreme Court. Pendleton v. Utah State Bar, 2000 UT 96, If 9, 16
P.3d 1230 (Utah 2000). Whenever the Committee takes public disciplinary action, it
does so in a judicial capacity and on behalf of the Supreme Court. Barnard, 804 P.2d at
529; Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 13. Committee members receive the same
immunity that judges receive. Id. The Utah State Bar has no authority to publicly
discipline attorneys absent explicit authorization from the Supreme Court. Barnard, 804
P.2d at 529. Though neither an administrative agency nor a court, due process requires
the screening panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court
be governed by the same principles as administrative law judges and trial judges because
its actions are state action.
Because actions by the Bar should be deemed state action, Matthews v. Eldridge
provides the framework for determining whether the action involved a due process
violation. One circumstance where the individual interest portion of the test triggers the
due process clause is known as the "stigma plus" situation. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976). Where a government action results in stigma to a person's reputation plus loss of
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employment or associational opportunities, there is a loss of liberty. Id. Such state action
is sufficient to require procedural due process. Id.
The public reprimand issued by the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah
Supreme Court meets the stigma plus test. Prior to the reprimand, Mr. Bowen was an
attorney in good standing with the bar. The purpose of a public reprimand is to warn the
public that an attorney might act in an unethical manner. See, Commentary, ABA
Standing Comm. on Prof 1 Disc, Procedure for Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 17. A
reprimand cautions potential clients and associates against forming professional
relationships. It changes his status with the Bar and affects his livelihood.
Matthews v. Eldridge requires that where a loss of liberty is involved, procedural
safeguards must be in place to ensure that the deprivation is not erroneous. One of the
most fundamental and valuable procedural safeguards of due process is that all parties to
a case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge. Anderson v. Industrial Com 'n of Utah,
696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). This requires absence of actual bias and endeavors to
prevent even the possibility of unfairness. Id. Where a member of a group that
investigates facts and recommends public punishment of an individual has a materially
adverse interest to the subject of that proceeding, unfairness is not only possible, it is
presumed. Id;Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons, 839 P.2d 874, 877 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
Anderson, though obviously not binding, is illustrative of this type of bias and
instructive as to when these standards should apply. In that case, Ms. Anderson appealed
the finding of an administrative adjudication. On appeal, the original judge had been
7

replaced by the person who was counsel opposed to Ms. Anderson in the original
adjudication. Using the statutory provisions governing the recusal of trial judges to
provide guidance, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the judge stating:
"Fairness requires not only the absence of actual bias, but endeavors to
prevent even the possibility of unfairness. This principle applies with as
much force to administrative hearings as it does to judicial trials. [Utah
Code § 78-7-1(3)] requires a trial judge to disqualify himself if he has
previously appeared as an attorney in the case. Although this statute does
not literally apply to administrative proceedings, the principal it embodies
is a useful and persuasive guide in reviewing administrative proceedings...
When a judge has previously been involved in a case as an attorney, there is
no need to show actual prejudice. The law presumes prejudice in such
circumstances."
Anderson, 696 P.2d at 1221. It is reasonable to apply the same type of analysis to
Committee members in an attorney disciplinary proceeding.
The same code section requiring disqualification of a judge where she has been an
attorney or counsel to either party also requires disqualification where the judge is a party
or otherwise interested. 78 Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-1. There is no reason not to apply the
same standards to attorney discipline proceedings by the Ethics and Discipline
Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. Indeed, the American Bar Association's Model
Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement suggest recusal should be required. Model
Rule I.2.F (2002) requires Committee members, referred to in the model rules as "board
members," to "refrain from taking part in any proceeding in which a judge, similarly
situated, would be required to abstain." See Addendum 6.
On March 1, 2006, the Committee recommended that Travis Bowen receive a
public reprimand. One member of the panel that issued the recommendation was
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Christine Greenwood. Ms. Greenwood is a partner and vice president of Magleby &
Greenwood, P.C.. See supra Addendum 4. James Magleby of Magleby and Greenwood,
is counsel for plaintiff in Neffv. Neff, case number 030100275, an ongoing case in the
First District Court of Utah. See supra Addendum 3. This case was underway and Travis
Bowen, as an individual and as a Professional Corporation, was a named defendant at the
time of the public reprimand.
On September 19, 2006, Ms. Greenwood's partner in Magleby & Greenwood,
James Magleby, brought a copy of the Bar Journal to oral arguments and used the public
reprimand in opposing Bowen's motion for summary judgment. On October 4, 2006,
Mr. Magleby made a "Supplemental filing relating to Bowen Defendant's Motions for
Summary Judgment." See Addendum 3. Item "I" in that filing concerns Mr. Bowen's
public reprimand. Mr. Magleby states:
"Plaintiff hereby supplements the record by submitting the Public
Reprimand report against Bowen.... In addition to being directly relevant
to credibility and intent, the transgressions by Bowen of the Utah Rules of
Professional Conduct reported in the Public Reprimand also bear striking
similarity to issues before the court on Bowen's motions."
Supra Addendum 3, p. 2. Mr. Maglebly's argument demonstrates why the conflict in this
case meets the second part of the stigma plus test. In addition to other employment or
associational problems that might arise from a public reprimand, the reprimand here has
deepened Mr. Bowen's involvement in costly and public litigation. Additionally, the
defendants in Bowen v. Burton, et. al., case no. 040927356, Third Judicial District Court,
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wasted no time in including the reprimand in their Motion to Compel Discovery. Both
of these episodes demonstrate why the disciplinary procedure violated due process.
Ms. Greenwood was only one member of a screening panel that determined that
Mr. Bowen had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended a public
reprimand, but her presumed bias is sufficient to void the entire panel's findings of fact,
conclusions of law and recommendation. Padilla, 839 P.2d at 877 (Bias presumed when
Parole Board member recuses herself and sits with the victim's family even when the
board member does not participate in the decision making process). When a biased
person sits on a panel, "[t]he infection of the concurrence of the interested person
spreads, so that the action of the whole body is voidable." Id.; quoting Pratt v. Mayor of
Dunellen, 89 A.2d 1, 5 (N.J. 1952). Because such a violation occurred here, the panel
violated Mr. Bowen's due process rights to a fair hearing. Id. Ms. Greenwood's
presence renders any action subsequent to that recommendation voidable.
Finally, it is true that this court has addressed whether the Lawyer Disciplinary
process satisfies due process requirements. Harding, 104 P.3d 1220. In Harding the
court found that the measures outlined in the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability
are adequate to ensure due process to a lawyer accused of misconduct. This case is much
different from Harding. For example, in Harding the proceeding was a formal complaint
allowing for confrontation of witnesses and cross-examination.

2

These same individuals filed the initial Bar Complaint against Mr. Bowen that is the
subject of this petition.
10

D. Principles Governing Lawyers And Judges Suggest That A Committee
Member Should Have The Affirmative Duty To Discover And Disclose
All Conflicts Of Interest.
Judges and attorneys have a duty to determine when conflicts exist, and obtain
consent from clients or parties to act as a judge or an attorney if a conflict does exist.
See, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7; Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 3. In a
situation such as this, where an attorney sits on the Supreme Court's Ethics and
Discipline Committee in judgment of another, the Committee member should have a duty
to discover and disclose conflicts.
Judges have the duty to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 2. Judges shall act to promote "public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Id. Judges should
disqualify themselves in any proceeding when a judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned including circumstances where the judge has a "personal bias or prejudice . . .
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." (Code
of Jud. Conduct, Canon 3(E)(1).) Members of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of
the Supreme Court are not judges, but they are acting as "an arm of the Supreme Court."
Pendleton, 2000 UT ^f 9. Even though the rules governing judicial recusal or the Code of
Judicial Conduct do not directly apply to them, the same principles that are used to
inspire confidence in the judiciary can well be extended to inspire confidence in the
Committee. Anderson, 696 P.2d at 1221 (Rules requiring recusal of judges apply to
administrative judges, even though not explicitly required by the statute).

li

As Ms. Greenwood's partner pointed out, this case involves a disciplinary matter
bearing "striking similarity to issues before the court" in Neffv. Neff, a high stakes
litigation where that plaintiff is represented by Ms. Greenwood's firm. (See Addendum
B, Neffv. Neff, Supplemental Filing Relating to Bowen Defendant's Motions for
Summary Judgment). The connection involves both bias, in that Ms. Greenwood's firm
believed a public reprimand was financially beneficial to its success in the litigation, and
personal knowledge of facts concerning Mr. Bowen's activities. These factors are
presumed to influence Ms. Greenwood's role as a third party neutral. Anderson, 696 P.2d
at 1221.
Respondent takes the position that the bias should not be considered because
"there is no evidence that she was interested in this proceeding, nor is there any evidence
that Mr. Magleby's use of the Utah Bar Journal summary of Mr. Bowen's public
reprimand has resulted in any decision adverse to Mr. Bowen." (Respondent's Brief
p. 12, emphasis in original). This argument demonstrates an incorrect understanding of
the conflicts laws and the purposes for which attorneys and judges are subject to recusal.
Bias is not determined by retrospective analysis of the results of a particular proceeding,
but by ex ante analysis of whether or not the decisionmaker might be consciously or
subconsciously influenced by his or her personal incentive in reaching a particular
outcome. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E). Rule 1.7 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct also takes an ex ante approach to analyzing conflicts and would
certainly not permit the defense raised by the Bar, that in retrospect the public reprimand
has not resulted in any ruling or decision adverse to Mr. Bowen. Regardless of the view
12

taken, Ms. Greenwood's partner has proven that either an ex ante or ex post analysis
shows a conflict. Ms. Greenwood should have recused herself because "a judge,
similarly situated" would have been required to recuse herself from this proceeding. See
ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule I.2.F (2002).
It is also useful to examine rules regarding how attorneys must handle conflicts of
interest with clients. Under the Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys have a duty to
investigate potential conflicts of interest among different clients. An attorney may not
represent a client when she has a conflict unless all relevant parties give written consent.
Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.7. Conflicts are bad because they bring an attorney's
independent judgment into question. (Comment, Rule 1.7. f 1.) The conflict may not be
waived in some situations. "To determine if a conflict exists, a lawyer should adopt
reasonable procedures appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine
in both litigation and nonlitigation matters the persons and issues involved. Ignorance
caused by a failure to institute such procedures does not excuse a lawyer's violation of
this Rule." (Comment, Rule 1.7.13.)
If Committee members have no duty to identify and disclose conflicts, this leads to
a strange result. In everyday operation of her business, a Committee member such as Ms.
Greenwood has the affirmative duty of checking for conflicts. Id. When she sits in an
esteemed position judging another member of the profession, she has no duty to discover
or avoid conflicts of interest. Ironically, one of the alleged rule violations for which Mr.
Bowen was reprimanded was Rule 1.7, Conflicts of Interest. (See Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation of Discipline: Public Reprimand.) A
13

Committee member with a clear, though then undiscovered, conflict of interest took part
in reprimanding Mr. Bowen for conflicts of interest.
A few jurisdictions have adopted conflicts rules for attorneys when serving as
neutral third party decisionmakers, explicitly placing the burden to discover and disclose
conflicts of interest to the parties. Thomas v. City of North Las Vegas, 127 P.3d 1057
(Nev. 2006); In re Report of The Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules and Policy
Committee on Senior Judges as Mediators, 915 So.2d 145 (Fla. 2005). The Supreme
Court should adopt such a rule for Committee members as well.
The alternative is to place the burden of discovering conflicts of interest on the
attorney who is appearing before the Committee. An attorney respondent does not know
the names of all of the Committee members' partners or associates. He or she cannot
possibly be expected to run a conflicts check on all the Committee members, all of their
partners, and all of their associates instantly on the day of a hearing. The attorney
respondent may or may not have ever met or heard of the Committee members before.
Everything about the disciplinary proceeding indicates that Committee members are in a
better position to investigate possible conflicts of interest prior to a disciplinary hearing.
They should have the burden of discovering and disclosing conflicts.
In the present case, when Ms. Greenwood's partner initiated the lawsuit against
Mr. Bowen, he was not affiliated with Ms. Greenwood, but was an attorney at Ballard,
Spahr, Andrews & Ingersoll. (Addendum C, Affidavit of Travis Bowen.) Though Ms.
Greenwood stated her name and law firm, she did not state the names of her partners.
She did not identify any conflict of interest. Respondent's rule would require a person in
14

front of the committee to instantly perform a conflicts check of every case he is involved
in personally or as an attorney to determine whether or not the panel member has any
conflicts. Mr. Bowen was not able to perform any such check, but suffice to say, he was
not aware of any conflict until well after the committee issued its findings.
To remedy the violation and avoid this problem in the future, there should be a
requirement that attorneys who sit as Committee members, in judgment of other
attorneys, must discover and disclose conflicts of interest. Where a conflict is discovered
after a disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court should overturn the findings of fact
and conclusions of law that resulted from that proceeding and remand for a new hearing.
A new hearing would best be conducted in front of the district court.

E. Mr. Bowen Did Not Waive The Conflict.
An attorney waives a conflict if he is aware of the conflict while his case is before
the hearing panel and he does not object. Virginia State Bar ex rel SecondDist
Committee 634 S.E.2d 341, 344 (Va. 2006). Where the attorney is not aware of the
conflict, he does not waive the conflict. Id.
Petitioner did not associate Ms. Greenwood's name and law firm's name with the
pending civil litigation against him. (Addendum 5.) Though Ms. Greenwood introduced
herself and gave her law firm's name, she did not identify the conflict of interest. Id.
She did not state that she was affiliated with James Magleby, who was prosecuting a civil
lawsuit in the First District Court against petitioner. Id. At the time the lawsuit
commenced against petitioner, Mr. Magleby was an attorney at Ballard, Spahr, Andrews
15

& Ingersoll. Petitioner did not realize that Mr. Magleby changed firms. Id, If Petitioner
was aware of this conflict, he would have objected to Ms. Greenwood's presence on the
committee. Id.
Where petitioner was unaware of the conflict of interest, he did not waive the
conflict.

F. The Court Should Order The Bar To Issue A Public Retraction of The
Reprimand And Proceed By Formal Complaint In The District Court.
There can be no doubt that Ms. Greenwood was an interested party at the time of
the Ethics and Discipline Committee's ruling against Mr. Bowen. As such, the Discipline
Committee's findings and conclusions must be presumed tainted and voidable. For these
reasons, Mr. Bowen requests this Court issue a declaratory judgment voiding the
Committee's findings and the Chair's order of public reprimand. The Bar should also be
required to publish a retraction of the reprimand at the next printing of the Utah Bar
Journal. A public retraction is the only remedy to the damage Mr. Bowen has
experienced to his professional reputation. Also, Mr. Bowen requests that the court
remand this case to the Utah Bar with instructions to proceed by way of formal
complaint. Based on Padilla, the Court should assume the findings of fact tainted, and
that the tainting conflict of interest penetrates the entire Ethics and Discipline Committee,
including the Chair. If the Court were to order a different screening panel to rehear the
complaint, the bias would not be eliminated. The rules specifically allow for review in an
informal proceeding from the screening panel's findings of fact before the Chair. In this
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case, Mr. Bowen exercised that right and asked the Chair to review findings of fact
tainted by Ms. Greenwood's presence on the screening panel.
The Bar has clearly taken the position that Mr. Bowen is entitled to no judicial
review in the District Court of the screening panel's findings. If the Bar is allowed to
simply proceed by way of informal complaint, Mr. Bowen would be left with no review
of the screening panel's findings by a trier of fact untainted by the prior proceedings. At
this point the only way to proceed on remand is by formal complaint. This would allow
for an untainted, on the record, decision making process by unbiased decision makers.

3

The Bar has demonstrated that such action would not deter it from publishing a public
reprimand anyway.
17

CONCLUSION
Mr. Bowen should be allowed to appeal an order of Public Reprimand from the
Ethics and Disciple Committee where the committee is acting in an official capacity as an
arm of the Supreme Court. Where a member of the panel recommending the public
reprimand was an interested party, the reprimand should be declared void. The court
should issue a declaratory judgment voiding the Order of Public Reprimand, order a
retraction, and remand the case with instructions to the Utah Bar to proceed by way of
formal complaint in the District Court.
DATED this /£?/Aday of January, 2007.
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE

Rebecca C. Hyde
Gregory G. Skordas
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 'c

day of January, 2007,1 mailed a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner, by United States first class mail, postage pre-paid, to the
following:

Billy Walker
Office of Professional Conduct
645 S. 200 E., Suite 205
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Skordas, Caston, & Hyde

ADDENDA
1. In re Travis Bowen, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law, and Recommendation of
Discipline: Public Reprimand, Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0628, 05-0448 (March 1,
2006).
2. In re Travis Bowen, Order of Discipline: Public Reprimand, Case No. 05-0391, 050433, 05-0628, 05-0448 (June 30, 2006)
3. Plaintiffs Supplemental Filing Relating to Bowen Defendants' Motions for Summary
Judgment, case number 030100275 (October 4, 2006).
4. Business Entity Search, https://secure.utah.gov/bes, September 21, 2006.
5. Affidavit of Travis L. Bowen
6. Statutes and Rules as follows:
Utah Const, art. VIII § 4
78 Utah Code Ann. §78-7-1
ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 1.2.F (2002)
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(E)
Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.7
Utah Rules Lwyr Disc, and Disab. Rule 3
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 10
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 11
Utah Rules Lwyr. Disc, and Disab. Rule 13
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ADDENDUM 1

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:
Travis Bowen, #00397
Respondent.

Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0448,
05-0628

The matter of the complaints by Keith Kelly, Richard Smurthwaite, Michael
Walch, and Trevin Workman against Travis Bowen came on for hearing before
Screening Panel "C-1" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme
Court on January 19, 2006. Mr. Kelly, Mr, Smurthwaite, Mr. Walch and Mr. Workman
appeared in person without counsel, Mr. Bowen appeared in person with Charles
Gruber and Mary Anne Wood as counsel; and Diane Akiyama, Assistant Counsel,
appeared on behalf of the Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC").
The Screening Panel recommends that Mr. Bowen be publicly reprimanded for violating
Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications
Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm
Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a)
(Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The facts upon which the Screening Panel has concluded the record establishes
probable cause of misconduct and, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr.
Bowen should be publicly reprimanded are as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Mr. Bowen's fees charged to his client in trade for office furniture was an

excessive fee considering the time and labor and the skill required to provide the
service.
2.

Mr. Bowen traded estate planning with a legal fee of $57,450.00 for the

office furniture.
3.

The fee charged by Mr. Bowen was in excess of the fees typically charged

for similar legal services in this community.
4.

Mr. Bowen instructed his staff to increase his standard legal fee for the

work to be performed in order to pay for the furniture sold to the firm by the client.
5.

Mr. Bowen would recommend that his clients purchase certain life

insurance products.
6.

Mr. Bowen represented clients without first disclosing to them his or his

firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained if the clients purchased certain life
insurance products.
7.

Mr. Bowen's expectation of financial benefits from the commissions as a

result of life insurance products was not disclosed during client meetings.
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8.

Mr. Bowen's letterhead showed office locations in Las Vegas, Nevada and

Walnut Creek, California when he did not have offices in those locations.
9.

The identification of the Walnut Creek and Las Vegas firm locations are

misleading to the public about the scope of services available to clients of Mr. Bowen's
firm.
10.

Mr. Bowen's placement of an office location in Idaho is misleading

because he does not have a law office in Idaho.
11.

Mr. Bowen used an "of counsel" relationship on his letterhead with

Jonathan Duke, when in fact, he did not have such a relationship.
12.

Mr. Duke did not grant his permission to Mr. Bowen nor to Mr. Bowen's

firm to indicate an "of counsel" relationship, or any other relationship, on the letterhead.
13.

Mr. Bowen knowingly failed to provide certain documents requested by

the OPC in this disciplinary matter.
14.

Some of the specific documents that the Screening Panel ("Panel")

discovered existed, but were not provided to the OPC in this disciplinary matter, are the
Crown Counsel Agreement, the Xelan Agreement, documents of purported agreements
with attorneys Duke and Oshins and email from Duke, and the invoice for furniture
purchased by Mr. Bowen's firm and paid with attorney services in part.
15.

Form client letters and/or disclosures regarding allegations of failure to

disclose benefits to the firm of third party services/products (i.e. insurance purchased by
clients) would have been extremely helpful to OPC and the Panel. Mr. Bowen did leave

3

with the Panel a stack of records that were represented to be these disclosures, but the
Panel could not consider the additional documents as a basis for its decision as the
hearing had concluded and the complainants were leaving.
16.

The disciplinary process was substantially impeded as a result of the

failure to provide documents to OPC.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Rule 1.5(a) (Fees))
1.

Rule 1.5(a) (Fees) states that "A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement

for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearly excessive when,
after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and
firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." This fee is in excess of the
fee typically charged for similar legal services in this community. Further, Laura Guthrie
testified that Mr. Bowen instructed her to increase Mr. Bowen's standard legal fees for
the work to be perfored in order to pay for the furniture sold to the firm by the client. By
charging to his client in trade for office furniture an excessive fee, considering the time
and labor and the skill required to provide the service, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 1.5(a)
(Fees).
(Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule))
2.

Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule) states that

A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes
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the representation will not be adversely affected; (2) and each client consents after
consultation.
Mr. Bowen's expectation of financial benefit from the commissions as a result of sales of
life insurance products was not disclosed during client meeting according to the testimony
of Laura Guthrie. By representing clients, no matter the number of clients, without first
disclosing to them Mr. Bowen's or his firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained by
the firm if the clients purchased certain life insurance policies, Mr. Bowen violated Rule
1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General Rule).
(Rule 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services))
3.

Rule 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) states that

"A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement
considered as a whole not materially misleading." Mr. Bowen violated Rule 7.1(a)
(Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services) when his letterhead showed office
locations in Las Vegas, Nevada and Walnut Creek, California when he did not have
offices in those locations.
(Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads))
4.

Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads) states that "A lawyer shall not

use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designation that violates Rule 7.1.. .."
Mr. Bowen testified regarding some affiliations perhaps in Las Vegas, Nevada and
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Walnut Creek, California however his testimony was not clear nor specific about the
alleged affiliations within those states. Mr. Bowen failed to produce any other evidence
in the form of witnesses or documents to show that his use of these office locations on
his letterhead was a proper representation of his firm's structure and services. The
OPC met its burden to prove that the identification of Walnut Creek and Las Vegas firm
locations were misleading to the public about the scope of services available to clients
of Mr. Bowen's firm. Additionally, Mr. Bowen's placement of an office location in Idaho
is misleading because he does not have a law office in Idaho. The panel finds that
considering the identification of the three out of state alleged law firm offices on Mr.
Bowen's letterhead, taken as a whole, is materially misleading the public, potential
clients and clients about the scope of services available, and the base of knowledge of
the firm's lawyers.

By listing office locations in Las Vegas, Nevada, Walnut Creek,

California and Idaho on his letterhead when he did not have law offices in those
locations, Mr. Bowen violated Rule 7.5(a) (Firm Names and Letterheads).
(Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads))
5.

Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads) states that "Lawyers may state

or imply that they practice in a partnership or other organization only when that is the
fact." Mr. Duke testified that he and Mr. Bowen had contemplated an "of counsel"
relationship, drafted a proposed agreement concerning a potential affiliation and
discussed the matter on and off, but nothing was concluded nor finalized between
them. Mr. Bowen did not produce any evidence to the contrary, except to state that Mr.
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Duke was "confused." The Panel finds that the OPC met its burden of proof to support
a violation by. Mr. Bowen of this rule. By the use of an "of counsel" relationship on his
letterhead with an attorney when, in fact, he did not have such a relationship, Mr.
Bowen violated Rule 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterheads).
(Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters))
6.

Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) states t h a t " . . . a

l a w y e r . . . in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not. . . knowingly fail to respond
to a lawful demand for information from . . . disciplinary authority, except that this Rule
does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6."
7.

The representation made at the Screening Panel Hearing consisted

mainly of a concern producing records in violation of Rule 1.6, confidentiality of client
matters and pending litigation between the Complainant and respondent. The Panel
considered the arguments regarding Rule 1.6 and pending litigation.

However, with

respect to those records that were clearly not related to client confidentiality (Rule 1.6),
or the pending litigation (which the Panel questions to be a valid excuse), Mr. Bowen
failed to provide them to OPC when requested to do so.

Some of the specific

documents that the Panel discovered existed, but were not provided to OPC would
have been helpful to OPC and to the Panel if provided before the Hearing, or, for some,
if provided at all. Additionally, form client letters and/or disclosures regarding allegations
of failure to disclose benefits to the firm of third party services/products (i.e. insurance
purchased by clients) would have been extremely helpful to OPC and the Panel.
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Although Mr, Bowen did leave with the Panel a stack of records that were represented
to be these disclosures the Panel could not consider the additional documents as a
basis for its decision. When the documents were provided, the hearing had concluded
and the complainants were leaving.
8.

The Panel was concerned that documents, such as forms of client

disclosures were not provided to OPC. The Panel felt that a strategy of "stonewalling"
was used so not to provide requested information to the OPC in defense of the
allegations against Mr. Bowen.

However, the Panel recognized the arguments that

appeared to have been brought in good faith by counsel for not producing some
documents.

The documents not related to client confidences should have been

produced as requested. The Panel finds that this disciplinary process was substantially
impeded as a result of the failure to provide documents to OPC. By failing to provide
certain documents requested by the OPC in this disciplinary matter, Mr. Bowen violated
Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters).

(Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct))
9.

Rule 8.4(a) (Misconduct) states that "It is professional misconduct for a

lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another." By violating the
aforementioned

Rules of Professional Conduct, Mr. Bowen violated Rule

(Misconduct).
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8.4(a)

RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE
Based upon the foregoing, the Screening Panel recommends that Travis Bowen
be publicly reprimanded for violation 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General
Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names
and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and
Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct), Rules of the Rules of Professional
Conduct
It is the intent of the Panel for the four cases against the respondent to be
consolidated into one case only. The facts and circumstances arise out of common
and connected events with the same complainants". Therefore, the Panel intends to
find only one instance of a violation for each rule.

DATED this / ^ d a y of

P e g | j Z ^ ^ a e h , Chair
Screening
*nihg FPanel " C - 1 "
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this U>4-V\

day of

•JMn

, 2006, I sent via

United States first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATION FOR
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to:
Travis Bowen
c/o Gregory Skordas
Skordas Caston & Morgan, L.L.C.
Boston Bldg. Ste. 1104
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
Richard Smurthwaite
503 West 2600 South
Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Trevin G. Workman
503 West 2600 South
Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Keith A Kelly
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Michael C. Walch
Gateway Tower, Suite 900
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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ADDENDUM 2

BEFORE THE ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

ORDER OF DISCIPLINE:
PUBLIC REPRIMAND

Bowen, Travis #00397

Case No. 05-0391, 05-0433, 05-0628,
05-0448

Respondent.
These matters came on for hearing on January 19, 2006 before Screening Panel
"C-1" of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court. The Chair of
the Ethics and Discipline Committee, having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and the Recommendation of Discipline of the Screening Panel, and being fully
advised in the premises, hereby orders that Travis Bowen be and is hereby, PUBLICLY
REPRIMANDED for violating Rules 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7(b) (Conflict of Interest: General
Rule) 7.1(a) (Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services), 7.5(a) (Firm Names
and Letterheads), 7.5(d) (Firm Names and Letterhead), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and
Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) (Misconduct) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
DATED this the 3 ^ d a y of JyUi^

Lawrence E. Stevens, Chair
Ethics and Discipline Committee

2006.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the (fl-Ht day of O a l ^

, 2006 I sent via United States

first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF
DISCIPLINE: PUBLIC REPRIMAND to:
Travis Bowen
do Gregory Skordas
Skordas Caston & Morgan, L.L.C.
Boston Bldg. Ste. 1104
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
Richard Smurthwaite
503 West 2600 South
Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Trevin G. Workman
503 West 2600 South
Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Keith A Kelly
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Michael C. Walch
Gateway Tower, Suite 900
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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ADDENDUM 3

James E. Magleby (7247)
Christopher M. Von Maack (10468)
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.

170 South Main Street, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 801.359.9000
Facsimile: 801.359.9011
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant Branson G. Neff
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BRANSON G. NEFF, an individual,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
FILING RELATING TO BOWEN
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
MARVIN G. NEFF, an individual, TRAVIS
L. BOWEN, ESQ., an individual, TRAVIS
L. BOWEN, P.C, a Utah professional
corporation, ABCO CONSTRUCTION,
INC., a Utah corporation, and WESTCo, an
unregistered partnership between
BRANSON G. NEFF and MARVIN G.
NEFF,
Defendants.

Civil No. 030100275
Honorable Gordon J. Low

Plaintiff Branson G. Neff ("Plaintiff or "Branson"), through counsel MAGLEBY &
GREENWOOD, P.C,

hereby submits this Plaintiffs Supplemental Filing Relating to Bowen

Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment.

INTRODUCTION
Since oral argument on the motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants, Travis L.
Bowen, P.C. and Travis L. Bowen (collectively, "Bowen"), Plaintiffs counsel realized that the
"Public Reprimand" issued by the Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court against
Bowen had not formally been made part of the record. Because Bowen's motion for partial
summary judgment relies, in part, upon testimony from Plaintiffs expert John Morris, Esq.
regarding Bowen's intent, and for other obvious reasons, this Public Reprimand is directly
relevant to the motions. Accordingly, Plaintiff now respectfully supplements the record with this
documentation. In addition, since Plaintiff is already supplementing the record, additional
information and documents also relating to the pending motions are also submitted herewith.
L

PUBLIC REPRIMAND
As noted, Plaintiff hereby supplements the record by submitting the Public Reprimand

report against Bowen. [See Public Reprimand, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. In sum, Bowen was

publicly reprimanded for charging "his client an excessive fee in trade for services," for
instructing "his staff to increase his standard legal fee in order to pay for the furniture sold to his
firm by the client/' for recommending "certain life insurance products without informing his
clients of his or his firm's financial interest in the profits to be gained if the clients purchase
those products," because his letterhead was misleading, and because Bowen "failed to provide
certain documents requested by the Office of Professional Conduct." [Public Reprimand, Ex. A].
In addition to being directly relevant to credibility and intent, the transgressions by
Bowen of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct reported in the Public Reprimand also bear
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striking similarity to issues before the Court on Bowen's motions. In particular, with regard to
the punitive damages issue, there is now additional evidence of Bowen's greed, including
Bowen's dishonesty by instructing "his staff to increase his standard legal fee in order to pay for
the furniture sold to his firm by the client," and Bowen's failure to disclose his conflicting
financial interests in certain insurance products the was recommending. [Public Reprimand, Ex. A].
Similar issues, such as Bowen continuing to do work for Marvin, even while ignoring Branson's
pleas for help, and the obvious financial incentives, are set forth in Branson's papers already on
file with the Court.
II.

PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTAL RULE 26(a) INITIAL
DISCLOSURES
After the completion of the briefing on Bowen's motions, Plaintiff completed certain

damages expert reports. [See Expert Report of John Brough, attached hereto as Exhibit "B"]; [See Appraisal of

Farr West, attached hereto as Exhibit "C"]. In addition, Plaintiff prepared and served upon counsel of
record Plaintiffs Supplemental Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures ("Plaintiffs Supplemental
Disclosures") . [See Plaintiffs Supplemental Disclosures, attached hereto as Exhibit "D"].

Plaintiffs Supplemental Disclosures set forth in detail Plaintiffs primary damages
theories against Marvin (and related entities) and Bowen. One theory relates to the argument
that even if there was an agreement by the one-page "Property Settlement" document, it was an
unenforceable "agreement to agree"; that any purported agreement is void for fraud; that any
purported agreement is void for failure of a condition precedent; and that any purported
agreement is void based upon Marvin's fundamental breaches of that agreement (among other
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legal theories). Branson has detailed five areas of damages which he seeks against Bowen
related to / arising from this theory. [See Plaintiffs Supplemental Disclosures at 4-5].
In the alternative, Branson seeks damages against Marvin and Bowen based upon the
assumption that Marvin's legal theory is correct, that the one-page "Property Settlement"
document is an enforceable agreement. In that event, Branson seeks at least nine areas of
damages which he seeks against Bowen related to / arising from this theory. [See Plaintiffs
Supplemental Disclosures at 9-10].

Accordingly, there is now additional evidence in the record regarding Plaintiffs specific
damages claims against Bowen.
III.

PROXIMATE CAUSE
As a threshold matter, for reasons already explained to the Court, expert testimony is not

necessary in Utah to establish proximate cause in an attorney malpractice action. Indeed, even in
very complicated cases (which this is not) and cases involving "somewhat strained" legal
theories (which this is not), the Utah Supreme Court has held that proximate cause is an issue of
fact for the jury. See, e.g., Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d. 1283, 1291 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996) (quoting Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995))
(additional quotations and citation omitted) cert, denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996), appeal
after remand, 2001 UT 107,37 P.3d 1130.
Other courts, considering analogous facts, are in accord. For example, in First Union
National Bank v. Benham, 423 F.3d 855, 863-865 (8th Cir. 2005), the court determined that no
expert testimony was required on proximate cause in a legal malpractice action asserting that
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defendant caused injury by failing to file a lawsuit to determine the fair value of certain stock.
Id. at 863-865. In fact, the jury was allowed to substitute its judgment for that of the
hypothetical jury that would have decided the stock value lawsuit. Id. Here, of course, one issue
is the value that Branson might have received had Bowen advised Branson not to sign any
documents until a full, final, and fair deal was reached; and if one could not be reached, the value
that a court would have found. As in First Union, a jury can decide these types of proximate
cause issues.
Similarly, the court in Morris v. Morris, 2003 WL 21509023 (Ohio App. 2003) held that
"an expert is not required to prove the third prong of a legal malpractice claim, or proximate
cause," and that the jury could infer proximate cause from the attorney's allowing a party to sign
one-sided documents that benefited a seller (in this case it was the buyer), had not reviewed or
discussed the agreements with the client before advising them to sign them, and had failed to
properly fill out an application for a liquor license. Here, Bowen did more than allow Branson to
sign one-sided documents, but he actually followed the instructions of Marvin to modify the
documents to benefit Marvin *s interest, communicated on important issues directly with Marvin
and not to Branson, chose to follow Marvin's instructions as to the division of real property even
though he knew Branson disagreed with Marvin's position, allowed- in fact encouraged Branson to sign real property deeds even though he knew of the brother's disagreement over the
property division, forged deeds, and the list goes on-and-on.
Even though these cases indicate that Branson does not need expert testimony on
proximate cause, as noted in the papers already on file with the Court, Mr. John Morris has given

5

and is prepared to testify about his opinions as to the "consequences" of Bowen's egregious
breaches of his fiduciary duty. As set forth in Mr. Morris'report:
Consequences of Breach
The joint representation affected the advice that Bow en could give and the actions
he could take on behalf of the Neffs. . . . [His attempted] neutrality prevented
Bowen from adequately representing either of the Neffs.
For example, Branson Neff needed independent and disinterested advice on
whether to sign the Property Settlement, Bowen's dual loyalties prevented him
from giving that advice. Branson Neff needed independent and disinterested
advice on whether to require security to back Marvin *s obligations to Branson.
Bowen's dual loyalties prevented him from giving that advice. Similarly, Branson
Neff needed independent and disinterested advice on other issues such as the
enforceability of the Property Settlement, Branson's rights to use equipment, the
salary continuation agreement, water rights and all of the other issues that were
disputed by the Neffs. Bowen's dual loyalties prevented him from giving that
advice. Also, Bowen prepared incorrect deeds to the farm property. Bowen
should not have given the signed erroneous deeds to Marvin Neff Bowen's dual
loyalties prevented him from acting in Branson Neff's interests on this issue.
More generally, many courses of action may be available to a client who is
directly adverse to another party. An independent and disinterested lawyer may
recommend any of these. A lawyer burdened with dual representation and dual
loyalties is precluded from giving that advice. This limitation demonstrates why
dual representation is prohibited in this situation.
[Expert Report of John Morris at 6-7 (emphasis added), attached hereto as Exhibit "E"].

To the extent there is any question about these, and other issues, Plaintiff Branson G.
Neff submits herewith a sworn statement, addressing some of the arguments made by Bowen's
counsel at the hearing, and including the following:
•

As Branson indicated in his deposition when asked whether or not there
was anything Bowen could do if he did not agree with Marvin: "I think at
least [Bowen] could put the stuff in front of you and show you what was
available and what could be done, the ramifications thereof." [Branson
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Depo., Vol. 4, 876-877 (emphasis added), Ex. F to Branson's Statement of Additional
Facts, Appendix 1 to Opposition to Bowen Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment].

If Bowen had told Branson not to sign any papers until a full, final, and
complete agreement had been reached, Branson would have taken his
advice. In fact, Branson raised exactly this issue with Bowen's office, and
was told to sign certain deeds anyway, but that Bowen's office would
make sure the documents didn't leave the office until there was a final
agreement on the property descriptions.
Although Branson testified that he generally did not like lawyers and
would do whatever possible to avoid having to use lawyers, Branson
obviously believed that a lawyer was necessary for purposes of dividing
assets between Marvin and Branson. Otherwise, he would not have gone
to the time and trouble of hiring Travis Bowen to represent him.
It was at all times Branson's belief that Travis Bowen represented Branson
(and Marvin) in the transaction. Bowen did not explain to Branson that
there were conflict of interest problems, nor the ramifications of those
problems. Certainly, Bowen did not explain to Branson the issues that
were raised in the letters he sent 1998, when the brothers came to Bowen
for asset protection work. Nor did Bowen have Branson sign or review
any similar letter in 1999, when the brothers went to him for assistance in
the buyout.
Under the previous documents prepared by Bowen, because both Marvin
and Branson were fifty percent (50%) owners in ABCO, no formal action
could have been taken by the company to divest Branson of any particular
rights, ownership, or benefits. In other words, if Marvin and Branson did
not reach an agreement, then there would have been a "stalemate."
If Bowen had told Branson not to sign any documents relating to a
potential agreement with Marvin, until such time as a full, final, and
complete agreement had been reached, Branson would have followed his
advice and not signed the one-page "Property Settlement" document, nor
the three additional documents prepared by Bowen, nor any of the real
property deeds relating to the farm house and other properties. In fact,
Branson did not want to sign some of these documents, but did so after he
was told to sign by his lawyer.
If Branson had been unable to reach an agreement with his brother, at least
he would have remained on paper as a fifty percent (50%) owner in
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ABCO, and would have been in a better position to demand fifty percent
(50%) of all the benefits from the company, including salary, health
insurance, auto benefits, and other benefits provided by the company to
Marvin and Branson.
•

In addition, if Bowen had explained to Branson that in the event of a
stalemate, he could ultimately force Marvin to buy his interest in the
company pursuant to the Share Redemption Agreement, and that the only
other alternative available to Marvin would have been that we continue to
operate the company as fifty-fifty (50/50) owners, Branson would have
been in a much better bargaining position than after Bowen let him sign
the one-page Property Settlement document.

•

In addition, because Bowen prepared the additional documents which
Branson signed, including the real property deeds which Branson did not
want to sign, but which Bowen's office told him would be kept safe,
Branson would not have had to spend the last four (4) years litigating the
issues in this case as to whether or not the Property Settlement was a
"final" document.

•

Because of Bowen's bad advice, or lack of advice, Branson lost recordtitle to the 5 Acres, and Marvin has now sold that property. If Branson
had never signed the deeds prepared by Bowen's office, Marvin would not
have been able to sell the 5 Acres.

•

Because of Bowen's bad advice, or lack of advice, Branson lost the ability
to file suit against Marvin for the unequal payments he made to his
children, totaling $63,000.

•

Because of Bowen's bad advice, or lack of advice, Marvin is asserting in
this case that Branson lost all rights to payments under the Salary
Continuation Agreement. If Bowen had told Branson not to sign any
documents until it was clear that Branson was going to continue to work
for ABCO and be qualified to the benefits of the Salary Continuation
Agreement, Branson would have followed that advice. Certainly, Bowen
did not tell Branson that he risked losing the benefits of the Salary
Continuation Agreement by signing documents before a final and
complete agreement was reached.

[Affidavit of Branson G. Neff, attached as Exhibit "F"].
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In short, had Bowen complied with his fiduciary duties, Branson would have obviously
followed his advice and not found himself in the unenviable position of trying to resist an
unenforceable "agreement to agree" which was put together by his adversary and brother Marvin
G. Neff, and the attorney Branson believed was representing him and defending his interests,
Travis L. Bowen. At the least, the jury gets to decide this issue.
Accordingly, to the extent there was any doubt that there are questions of fact on the
issue of proximate cause, that question has (again) been unequivocally answered in the negative.
The Court must deny Bowen's motion for summary judgment "if there is any evidence upon
which a reasonable jury could infer causation." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1293 (emphases in
original). And, "'it only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the
other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1292
(quotations and citation omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the additional reasons noted, the Court should deny Bowen's motions for summary
judgment.
DATED this 4th day of October 2006.
MAGLEBY 4fGkEH>IWOOD, P.C.

James E. Magleby
Christopher M. Von Maack
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant Branson G. Neff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am employed by the law firm of MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.,
170 South Main Street, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that pursuant to Rule 5(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S
SUPPLEMENTAL FILING RELATING TO BOWEN DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was delivered to the following this 4th day of October 2006 by:
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile
[X] Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Electronic Mail
Marlin J. Grant
James C. Jenkins

Michael F. Skolnick
J. Kevin Murphy
Gary T. Wight

OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

88 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321-0525

KIPP & CHRISTIAN

10 Exchange Place, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaim
Plaintiff and Cross Claim Plaintiff
Marvin G. Neff
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Attorneys for Defendants and Cross Claim
Defendants Travis L. Bowen, Esq. and
Tm\is 1. Bowen, P.C

ADDENDUM 4

Search Utah.govi

Business Entity Search
Name

Type

MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.
Business Name:
Entity Number:
Registration Date:
State of Origin:

Corporation
Unknown
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.
5820928-0144
01/26/2005

City

Status
Active

Address
Unknown, NA 00000

Status
Status:
Status Description:
This Status Date:
Last Renewed:
License Type:
Delinquent Date:

Active
Good Standing
01/26/2005
12/09/2005
Corporation - Professional
01/26/2007

Registered Agent
Registered Agent:

JAMES E MAGLEBY
rSearch BES1 fSearch RPS1
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD PC
170 S MAIN ST STE 350
Salt Lake City
UT
84101

Address Line 1:
Address Line 2:
City:
State:
Zip:

Additional Information
NAICS Code:
NAICS Title:
Stock Class 1 Amount:
Stock Class 1 Type:

5411
5411-Legal Services
100000
VOTING COMMON

With this information, you can.
If you would like to purchase a Certificate of Existence for this business entity, select the
button to the left. You will be assessed a $ 12.00 fee for this service. You will need Adobe
Reader to view this certificate. If you do not have Adobe Reader, click on the button
below and download it.

m
mm
If you would like to receive information on the principal individuals associated with this
entity, click the button on the left. You will be assessed a $ 1.00 fee for this information.

Department of Commerce Home | Division of Corporations Home | Contact Us
;://secure.utah.gov/bes/action/searchresults
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ADDENDUM 5

GREGORY G. SKORDAS (#3865)
REBECCA C. HYDE (#6409)
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE
Suite 1104 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531^7444
Facsimile: (801) 531-8885
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TRAVIS L. BOWEN,
Petitioner,
vs.
UTAH STATE BAR,
Respondent.

:
: AFFIDAVIT OF TRAVIS L. BOWEN
:
:
: CaseNo.20060950-SC
:
: OPC No. 05-0391,05-0433,05-0628,05: 0448

STATE OF UTAH

)
:SS.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Affiant, Travis L. Bowen, being first duly sworn, deposes and states the following:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one years, am competent in all respects to testify

and have personal knowledge of the matters asserted herein.
2.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah.

3.

On January 19,20061 attended a hearing before a screening panel ofthe Utah

Supreme Court's Ethics and Discipline Committee involving several informal complaints against

me.
4.

The screening panel that heard my disciplinary matters had four members.

I do not recall whether the members of the panel were introduced prior to or during the hearing.
5.

I do not recall Christine Greenwood's firm affiliation with attorney James

Magleby being disclosed prior to or during the hearing.
6.

Christine Greenwood did not disclose during the hearing that she was the law

partner of an attorney, James Magleby, who was prosecuting a civil lawsuit in First District Court
("the First District Suit") against me.
7.

I am aware that James Magleby was employed by thefirm,Ballard, Spahr

Andrews & Ingersoll at the outset of the First District Suit.
8.

I am aware that Mr. Magleby moved to a different firm at some point in time

while the First District Suit was pending.
9.

I did not pay any attention to the name of the firm orfirmswhich employed

Mr. Magleby after he left the Ballard, Spahr firm.
10.

I was not aware at the time of the January 19,2006 screening panel hearing

that Christine Greenwood was Mr. Magleby9 s law partner.

Page -2-

11.

Had I been aware or been made aware I would have objected or asked my

counsel to object based on the obvious conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety.
DATED this Z]_ day of November/lOT^T

TRAVIS L. BOWEN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this £ j ! day of November, 2006

My Commission Expires:
_ _ CONOR P. BU E
NOTARY PUBUC-STATEOFUTAH
.
316111HAVS.

wjtArecir* w 84ios
MyComm. Exp. 05/16/2009

C:\Documents and Settings\TBowen\Local SettingsYTemporary Internet Files\OLK3D0\Affidavit of Travis Bowen.wpd
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ADDENDUM 6

U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 8, § 4
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE VIII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
-•Sec. 4. [Rulemaking power
Regulation of practice of law]

of

Supreme

Court—Judges

pro

tempore—

The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used in the
courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The
Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature.
Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore
to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the
United States, Utah residentsf and admitted to practice law in Utah. The
Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of lawf including admission to
practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice
law.
Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

web2.westlawxom/print/printstream.aspx?prft^
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UT ST § 78-7-1
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-7-1
WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART I. COURTS
CHAPTER 7. GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES
•*§ 78-7-1. Disqualification for interest or relation to parties
(1) Except by consent of all parties, no justice, judge, or justice court judge
may sit or act in any action or proceeding:
(a) to which he is a party, or in which he is interested;
(b) when he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within
the third degree, computed according to the rules of the common law; or
(c) when he has been attorney or counsel for either party in the action or
proceeding.
(2) The provisions of this section do not apply to the arrangement of the
calendar or the regulation of the order of business, nor to the power of
transferring the action or proceeding to some other court.
Statutes and Constitution are current through end of 2006 legislation
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

web2.westlawxom/print/printstream.aspx?prft=
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Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement
I. Structure And Scope
Rule 2. The Disciplinary Board Of The Supreme Court Of [This State]
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A. Agency. There is hereby established one permanent statewide agency to administer the
lawyer discipline and disability system. The agency consists of a statewide board as
provided in this Rule 2, hearing committees as provided for in Rule 3, disciplinary counsel as
provided for in Rule 4, and staff appointed by the board and counsel. The agency is a unitary
entity. While it performs both prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, these functions shall
be separated within the agency insofar as practicable in order to avoid unfairness. The
prosecutorial functions shall be directed by a lawyer employed full-time by the agency and
performed, insofar as practicable, by employees of the agency. The adjudicative functions
shall be performed by practicing lawyers and public members. No official of the [state bar]
shall have the right to appoint any members or serve in an ex officio capacity.
P>

A. Appointment. A board shall be appointed by the court with the requisite authority and
responsibility to administer the lawyer discipline and disability system. The board shall
consist of [nine] members to serve for fixed, staggered terms, and to be referred to as the
"board," which shall consist of:
(1) [Two] members of the bar of this state and [one] public member appointed for
an initial term of three years;
(2) [Two] members of the bar of this state and [one] public member appointed for
an initial term of two years; and
(3) [Two] members of the bar of this state and [one] public member appointed for
an initial term of one year.
Subsequent terms of all members shall be for three years. No member shall serve more than
two consecutive three-year terms. The members of the board shall not be subject to removal
by the court during their terms of office except for cause.

C * A. Election of Officers. The members of the board shall annually elect [the Court shall annually
appoint] lawyer members as chair and vice-chair. The chair, and in the chair's absence the
vice-chair, shall perform the duties normally associated with that office and shall preside
over all meetings of the full board, ruling on all motions, objections, and evidence.
I?* A. Quorum. [Five] members shall constitute a quorum. The board shall act only with the
concurrence of a majority of the whole board except as to administrative matters, which
shall only require a majority of those present and voting.
£r , A. Compensation and Expenses. Members shall receive no compensation for their services, but
may be reimbursed for travel and other expenses incidental to the performance of their
duties.
f~* A. Abstention and Disqualification of Board Members; [Alternate Members].
(1) Board members shall refrain from taking part in any proceeding in which a
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judge, similarly situated, would be required to abstain.
(2) In addition to complying with the Rules of Professional Conduct regarding a
former judge or arbitrator (Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.12), a former
member of the board shall not personally represent a lawyer in any proceeding
as provided in these Rules for a period of one year following completion of the
member's service.
[(3) The court shall maintain current rosters of lawyer and nonlawyer alternates.
If a board member becomes incapacitated or disqualified, the next alternate on
the appropriate roster shall take the place of the board member in the matter.]
A. Powers and Duties. The board shall have the following powers and duties:
(1) To propose rules of procedure for lawyer discipline and disability
proceedings for promulgation by the court, and to comment on the enforceability
of existing and proposed [Rules of Professional Conduct];
(2) To review periodically the operation of the system with the court;
(3) To appoint three or more hearing committees [within each disciplinary
district] and
(i) establish the rotation by which they will be assigned formal
hearings,
(ii) designate the chair for each, and
(Hi) assign the chair to review in rotation dispositions by the central
intake office, recommendations of counsel for disposition of
disciplinary matters and petitions for transfer to and from disability
inactive status pursuant to Rule 3(E)(1);
(4) To perform appellate review functions, consisting of review of the findings of
fact, conclusions of law and recommendations of adjudicators in hearings on
lesser misconduct pursuant to Rule 18(H) and of hearing committees with
respect to formal charges, petitions for transfer to and from disability inactive
status, and petitions for reinstatement, and prepare and forward to the court its
own findings, if any, and recommendations, together with the record of the
proceedings before the hearing committee;
(5) To administer reprimands;
(6) To impose probation for a specified period with the consent of the
respondent;
(7) To appoint and supervise its staff [including counsel], separate from the
prosecutorial staff, to assist the board in its functions;
(8) To inform the public about the existence and operation of the system and the
disposition of each matter in which public discipline has been imposed, a lawyer
has been transferred to or from disability inactive status, or a lawyer has been
reinstated or readmitted; and
(9) To delegate, in its discretion, to the chair or vice chair the power to act for the
board on administrative and procedural matters.

Commentary
With more than 750,000 lawyers licensed to practice in the United States, the highest courts of
the states cannot handle discipline and disability matters directly by themselves. The agency
assists the court in the exercise of its inherent power to supervise the bar, inquiring into all
matters assigned to its jurisdiction by the court's rules of disciplinary enforcement. The agency
performs
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, and reports its findings and
recommendations to the court.
A statewide system provides the greatest degree of structural impartiality since it minimizes the
adverse effects of local bias. Moreover, a statewide structure provides uniformity, since only a
single statewide court and a single statewide agency are involved in the process. In a
decentralized structure, complaints in one community may be governed by one set of standards
and those in a different community by another. Consequently, lawyers admitted to practice in the
same state may receive radically different discipline for the same misconduct
A single statewide agency avoids these problems by imposing a single standard of conduct
throughout the state.
In a unitary system, both prosecution and adjudication are the responsibility of a single agency.
Nevertheless, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions should be separated as much as possible
within the unitary system to avoid unfairness and any appearance of unfairness. Persons who
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perform prosecutorial functions should neither perform nor supervise persons who perform
adjudicative functions, and vice versa. In addition, persons who perform adjudicative functions in
a particular matter at a preliminary stage should not thereafter perform nor have control over
persons who must later perform ultimate adjudicative functions in the same matter.
The disciplinary system should be controlled and managed exclusively by the state's highest
court and not by state or local bar associations for these compelling reasons. First, the
disciplinary process should be directed solely by the disciplinary policy of the court and its
appointees and not influenced by the internal politics of bar associations. Second, the
disciplinary system should be free from even the appearance of conflicts of interest or
impropriety. When elected bar officials control all or parts of the disciplinary process, these
appearances are created, regardless of the actual fairness and impartiality of the system. This is
true whether the bar is unified or not.
Bar associations can properly manage such programs as mandatory fee arbitration, lawyer
practice assistance, continuing legal education, voluntary arbitration and mediation. Bar
operation of these programs does not create a conflict of interest or the appearance of
impropriety. Although some of these programs may interact with the disciplinary process, it is
entirely appropriate for the organized bar to cooperate with the court in the administration of such
programs. Nothing in these rules should be construed as prohibiting bars from continuing to
manage non-disciplinary matters nor should these rules be interpreted to support the elimination
of unified state bars. Indeed, given the funding requirements of many of these programs, bars
will be performing a vital public service in fulfilling these functions.
It is of course desirable, and in the larger states essential, for the board to have available the
assistance of staff to carry out its functions. Staff responsible directly to the board, totally
separate from counsel, should be hired for that purpose to further the separation of the
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions within the unitary agency.
In the appointment process, there should be appropriate representation of all segments of the
public and the profession, including minority members, women, and solo or small firm
practitioners. A combination of lawyers and nonlawyers on the board results in a more balanced
evaluation of complaints. Currently more than two-thirds of all jurisdictions involve public
members in their disciplinary structure. Participation by nonlawyers increases the credibility of
the discipline and disability process in the eyes of the public. There is a human tendency to
suspect the objectivity of a discipline body composed solely of members of the respondent's
professional colleagues. Involving public members helps allay that suspicion.
It is recommended that the board have at least nine members. A multiple of three is necessary to
preserve a ratio of two-thirds lawyers and one-third public members. A three-member board may
be simply too small to enable volunteers to cope with the workload. A six-member board is not
recommended because an even-numbered membership makes possible a tie vote. At least onethird [or a higher proportion] of all adjudicators should be nonlawyers.
The members of the board should be appointed by the court since the agency is created to assist
the court in carrying out its discipline and disability functions. The court may appoint a roster of
alternates to be available if a board member becomes incapacitated or disqualified. A roster of
alternates avoids the necessity of selecting a particular individual to sit for a particular case,
which may raise claims of unfairness.
Board members should not be appointed for more than two consecutive terms. Absence of
periodic rotation restricts the number of individuals who can participate and may perpetuate
outmoded practice and procedures. The terms of the members should not be so long that the
disciplinary function is inaccessible and unresponsive to changes in the lawyer community.
Terms should not be longer than three years. Periodic rotation of the members requires that
terms be set in multiples of three. A six-year term would allow a member to serve for twelve
consecutive years, which may inhibit responsiveness to the changes in legal practice in the
community.
The board members should elect their own chair and vice-chair, both of whom should be lawyers
since they will preside over appeals and rule on motions and evidence.
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If Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.12(c)(1) and (2) are complied with, a lawyer in the firm of
a former board member is not imputedly disqualified.
The court and the board should cooperate in the administration of the system. In performing the
duties imposed by the system, the board's staff should perform record keeping functions, docket
matters to be heard by the board, prepare reports and financial documents, and perform similar
administrative tasks. Although it is the court's responsibility to promulgate the rules governing
the structure, the court should give great weight to the board's recommendations.
Recommendations to the court pertaining to the operation of the system generally should be
distinguished from ex parte communications about individual cases.
To ensure there is adequate oversight, the court may wish to have the administrative arm of the
court review the budget and provide comments to the court and disciplinary counsel. The board
and disciplinary counsel should periodically file reports concerning their operations with the
court.
Hearing committees are appointed by the board but function independently. The board should
appoint at least three hearing committees, since two hearing committees may be disqualified
because of the participation by their chairs in the review of recommendations of counsel for
disposition of a matter after investigation.
Lawyer population and the size of the state may require the state to be divided into disciplinary
districts. If that becomes necessary, at least three hearing committees should be appointed per
district.
The presiding officer of the hearing committee should be a lawyer since the presiding officer
rules on motions and objections. The composition of the hearing committee, membership
rotation, and the length of terms of the members should be determined by weighing the same
factors applied to board members. Hearing committee members should be assigned to each
committee permanently, not ad hoc. Hearing committees should be scheduled in advance to
meet at fixed intervals and in rotation, not ad hoc. This greatly reduces the administrative burden
of scheduling meetings and systematizes the work flow for both the board and counsel.
The board may prepare and forward its own findings and recommendations and administer
reprimands. The report and recommendation of the board is advisory only. The court may modify
the findings and may increase or decrease the discipline recommended.
The public interest is served by wide publication of the availability of a process for investigating
and disposing of substantial allegations of misconduct. Care should be taken in doing so, to
avoid encouraging frivolous or unfounded complaints.
Increasing the public's awareness of the discipline and disability process can be accomplished
in many ways. The agency can prepare a short fact sheet or pamphlet, describing what it does
and how it does it, explaining where and how to get information. The rules governing the
agency's operations should be readily available. Public information about the system and cases
within it should be easily accessible on request
Public confidence in the discipline and disability process will be increased as the profession
acknowledges the existence of lawyer misconduct, and shows the public what the agency is
doing about it.

W Next - RULE 3. HEARING COMMITTEES
W Table of Contents
W Center for Professional Responsibility
Back to Top
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UT R CJC Canon 3
Code of Jud.Conduct, Canon 3
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
PART II. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
CHAPTER 12. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
-4CANON 3. A judge shall perform the duties of the office impartially
and diligently
A. Judicial Duties in General. The judicial duties of a full-time judge take
precedence over all the judge's other activities. The judge's judicial duties
include all the duties of the judge's office prescribed by law.
In the
performance of these duties, the following standards apply.
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in
which disqualification is required or permitted by rule, or transfer to another
court occurs.
(2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional competence. A judge
shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism.
(3) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before the judge.
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors,
witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court
officials, and others subject to judicial direction and control.
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge
shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest
bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status, and should not permit, and shall use all reasonable
efforts to deter, staff, court officials and others subject to judicial
direction and control from doing so. A judge should be alert to avoid behavior
that may be perceived as prejudicial.
(6) A judge should require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain
from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic
status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others.
This Canon does not
preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, or other similar
factors, are issues in the proceeding.
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who is legally interested in a
proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right to be heard according to law.
Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor consider, and
shall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or
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impending proceeding.
A judge may consult with the court personnel whose
function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's adjudicative
responsibilities or with other judges provided that the judge does not abrogate
the responsibility to personally decide the case pending before the court. No
communication respecting a pending or impending proceeding shall occur between
the trial judge and an appellate court unless a copy of any written
communication or the substance of any oral communication is provided to all
parties. A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law
applicable to a proceeding before the court if the judge gives notice to the
parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords
the parties reasonable opportunity to respond. A judge may, with the consent
of the parties either in writing or on the record, confer separately with the
parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending
before the judge.
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and
fairly.
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court,
make any public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome
or impair its fairness or make any nonpublic comment that might substantially
interfere with a fair trial or hearing.
A judge should require similar
abstention on the part of court personnel subject to judicial direction and
control. This Canon does not prohibit a judge from making public statements in
the course of official duties or from explaining for public information the
procedures of the court. This Canon does not apply to proceedings in which a
judge is a litigant in a personal capacity.
(10) A judge shall not commend or criticize jurors for their verdict other than
in a court order or opinion in a proceeding but may express appreciation to
jurors for their service to the judicial system and the community.
(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for purposes unrelated to judicial
duties, information acquired in a judicial capacity that is not available to
the public.
C. Administrative Responsibilities.
(1)
A
judge
shall
diligently
discharge
the
judge's administrative
responsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence in
judicial administration, and cooperate with other judges and court officials in
the administration of court business.
(2) A judge should require staff,
judicial direction and control to
diligence that apply to the judge
prejudice in the performance of their

court officials and others subject to
observe the standards of fidelity and
and to refrain from manifesting bias or
official duties.

(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance of other
judges should take reasonable measures to assure the prompt disposition of
matters before them and the proper performance of their other judicial
responsibilities.
(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary appointments, shall exercise the power
of appointment impartially and on the basis of merit, and shall avoid nepotism
and favoritism.
A judge shall not approve compensation of appointees beyond
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the fair value of services rendered.
D. Disciplinary Responsibilities. A judge should take or initiate appropriate
disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of
which the judge may become aware. This section does not apply to information
generated and communicated under the policies of the Judicial Performance
Evaluation Program.
E. Disqualification.
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
instances where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a
party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, had
practiced law with a lawyer who had served in the matter at the time of their
association, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness
concerning it;
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, or the
judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any other member of the
judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in
the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or has any
other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by
the proceeding;
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that
could be substantially affected by the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
(2) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary
economic interests, and should make a reasonable effort to keep informed about
the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse and minor children
residing in the judge's household.
F. Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3E
may disclose the basis of the judge's disqualification and ask the parties and
their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive
disqualification.
If following disclosure of any basis for disqualification
other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and
lawyers, without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge need not
be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may
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participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be entered on the record,
or if written, filed in the case file.
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Rules of Prof.Conduct, Rule 1.7
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
PART II. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
CHAPTER 13. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP
-+RULE 1.7. CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) f a lawyer shall not represent a client
if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent
conflict of interest exists if:
(a)(1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to another
client; or
(a)(2) There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the
lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under
paragraph (a) f a lawyer may represent a client if:
(b)(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(b)(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(b)(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation
or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(b)(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
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UT R BAR LWYR DISC AND DISAB Rule 14-503
UT Lawyer Discipline and Disability Rule 14-503
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
PART II. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
CHAPTER 14. RULES GOVERNING THE UTAH STATE BAR
ARTICLE 5. LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY
-*RULE 14-503. ETHICS AND DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE
(a) Composition. The Committee shall be appointed by the Supreme Court.
The
Committee shall consist of eight public members and 26 members of the Bar who
have demonstrated a high standard of professional conduct. All appointments
shall be for a term of three years. The Supreme Court shall designate one
lawyer member as Committee chair and one lawyer member as Committee vice
chair. Committee members shall not serve more than two consecutive terms.
(b) Committee chair.
The Committee chair shall supervise the Committee and
screening panels.
The chair is responsible to maintain an adequate check on
the work of the screening panels to ensure that matters move forward
expeditiously, to determine that screening panels have a uniform basis for the
judgments renderedf and to provide the screening panels with information
concerning ethics and judicial decisions necessary to their activities. The
chair shall make recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning appointments
to the screening panels and reports concerning the activities of the screening
panels and the overall work of the Committee.
(c) Vice chair. The Committee vice chair shall act in the event of the chair's
absence or resignation. The chair may call upon the vice chair to assist in
any of the Committee chair's duties.
(d) Screening panels, quorums. The Committee membersf except for the Committee
chair and Committee vice chair, shall be divided into four screening panel
sections of six members of the Bar and two public members. The Supreme Court
shall name a screening panel chair from each screening panel, who shall preside
over the screening panel.
In the absence of the screening panel chair, a
screening panel vice chair designated by the screening panel shall preside. Two
members of the Bar plus one public member shall constitute a quorum of a
screening panel.
The concurrence of a majority of those members present and
voting at any proceeding shall be required for a screening panel determination.
If an even number of screening panel members participate in a proceeding, the
chair or vice chair shall not vote unless necessary to break a tie. The chair
or vice chair shall, however, fully participate in the proceeding. Each
screening panel shall meet as is necessary to effectively and promptly carry
out its duties. The entire Committee may be convened at such other times by
the chair as necessary to effectively and promptly carry out its duties.
(e) Resignations, alternates.
If a Committee member does not attend three
consecutive scheduled screening panel hearings, that Committee member shall
automatically be deemed to have resigned his or her Committee appointment.
Members of any screening panel may serve as alternate members on different
screening panels. The Committee chair and the Committee vice chair may serve
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as alternate members on all screening panels.
(f) Responsibilities.
Informal complaints shall be randomly assigned to
screening panels. The screening panels shall review, investigate, and hear all
informal complaints charging unethical and/or unprofessional conduct against
members of the Bar.
After such review, investigation, hearing and analysis,
the screening panels shall determine the action to be taken on any informal
complaint which, based upon the facts of the particular case, is most
consistent with the public interest and the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(g) Subpoena.
Any party or a screening panel, for good cause shown, may
petition under seal the district court for issuance of a subpoena, subpoena
duces tecum or any order allowing discovery prior to the filing of a formal
complaint.
Except for good cause shown, all petitions under this rule shall
require a five-day written notice to the opposing party prior to the issuance
of an appropriate order of subpoena.
(g)(1) Enforcement
of subpoena.
A district court in the district in which the
attendance or production is required may, upon proper application, enforce the
attendance and testimony of any witnesses and the production of any documents
subpoenaed.
(g)(2) Quashing subpoena.
Any attack on the validity of a subpoena so issued
shall be heard and determined by the Committee chair or by the court wherein
enforcement of the subpoena is being sought.
Any resulting order is not
appealable prior to the entry of a final order in the proceeding.
(g)(3) Witnesses
and fees.
Subpoena fees, witness fees, and mileage shall be
reimbursed in the amounts provided under Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
(h)(1) Committee and OPC as screening panel secretary. OPC counsel shall be
the secretary to the Committee and is charged with the responsibility of the
administrative affairs of the Committee, the handling of the screening panel
calendars, giving notice to screening panel members and members of the Bar
whose attendance is requested, notifying those who have filed informal
complaints of the times and dates their matters will be heard, and otherwise
performing or providing the secretarial and administrative functions of the
Committee and screening panels. Except as otherwise provided in this article,
whenever OPC counsel may be present before a screening panel during a hearing,
the respondent may also be present.
(h)(2) OPC counsel shall within three months after the filing of an informal
complaint of unprofessional or unethical conduct of a respondent, advise the
party making the informal complaint concerning the initial consideration of the
informal complaint, and shall promptly advise such party in writing of the
subsequent disposition of the informal complaint and the reasons therefor.
(i) Annual report. Senior counsel shall prepare and submit an annual report to
the Supreme Court and the Board encompassing the scope and nature of the
Committee work.
The report shall be submitted on or about August 1 of each
year for the preceding fiscal year and shall set forth the number of
disciplinary cases investigated, the number brought before the Committee,
formal complaints filed, dispositions, cases dismissed, informal ethics
opinions issued, diversionary dispositions and such other information as may be
helpful to the Supreme Court in comprehending the operations of the OPC as well
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as the efficiency and effectiveness of the disciplinary system.
Such report
may contain Committee recommendations for rule amendments or changes in
Committee procedure. The chair and senior counsel shall annually consult with
the Board and the Supreme Court regarding the level of activity and general
standing of disciplinary matters and procedures.
Current
2006

with

amendments

effective

November

1,

Copr © 2006 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

veb2.westlawxom/print/printstream.aspx?prft=^

Page 3 of 3

UT R BAR LWYR DISC AND DISAB Rule 14-510
UT Lawyer Discipline and Disability Rule 14-510
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
PART II. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
CHAPTER 14, RULES GOVERNING THE UTAH STATE BAR
ARTICLE 5. LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY
-»RULE 14-510. PROSECUTION AND APPEALS
(a) Informal complaint of unprofessional conduct.
(a)(1) Filing.
A disciplinary proceeding may be initiated against any member
of the Bar by any person, OPC counsel or the Committee, by filing with the Barr
in writing, an informal complaint in ordinary, plain and concise language
setting forth the acts or omissions claimed to constitute unprofessional
conduct. Upon filing, an informal complaint shall be processed in accordance
with this article.
(a)(2) Form of informal
complaint.
The informal complaint need not be in any
particular form or style and may be by letter or other informal writing,
although a form may be provided by the OPC to standardize the informal
complaint format.
It is unnecessary that the informal complaint recite
disciplinary rules, ethical canons or a prayer requesting specific disciplinary
action.
The informal complaint shall be signed by the complainant and shall
set forth the complainant's address, and may list the names and addresses of
other witnesses.
The informal complaint shall be notarized and contain a
verification attesting to the accuracy of the information contained in the
complaint. In accordance with Rule 14-504(b), complaints filed by OPC are not
required to contain a verification.
The substance of the informal complaint
shall prevail over the form.
(a)(3) Initial
investigation.
Upon the filing of an informal complaint, OPC
counsel shall conduct a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether the
informal complaint is sufficiently clear as to its allegations. If it is not,
OPC counsel shall seek additional facts from the complainant; additional facts
shall also be submitted in writing and signed by the complainant.
(a)(4) Notice
of
informal
complaint.
Upon completion of the preliminary
investigation, OPC counsel shall determine whether the informal complaint can
be resolved in the public interest, the respondent's interest and the
complainant's interest. OPC counsel and/or the screening panel may use their
efforts to resolve the informal complaint. If the informal complaint cannot be
so resolved or if it sets forth facts which, by their very nature, should be
brought before the screening panel, or if good cause otherwise exists to bring
the matter before the screening panel, OPC counsel shall cause to be served a
NOIC by regular mail upon the respondent at the address reflected in the
records of the Bar.
The NOIC shall have attached a true copy of the signed
informal complaint against the respondent and shall identify with particularity
the possible violation(s) of the Rules of Professional Conduct raised by the
informal complaint as preliminarily determined by OPC counsel.

r
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(a)(5) Answer to informal
complaint.
Within 2 0 days after service of the NOIC
on the respondent, the respondent shall file with OPC counsel a written and
signed answer setting forth in full an explanation of the facts surrounding the
informal complaint, together with all defenses and responses to the claims of
possible misconduct. For good cause shown, OPC counsel may extend the time for
the filing of an answer by the respondent not to exceed an additional 30 days.
Upon the answer having been filed or if the respondent fails to respond, OPC
counsel shall refer the case to a screening panel for investigation,
consideration and determination.
OPC counsel shall forward a copy of the
answer to the complainant.
(a)(6) Dismissal
of informal
complaint.
An informal complaint which, upon
consideration of all factors, is determined by OPC counsel to be frivolous,
unintelligible, barred by the statute of limitations, more adequately addressed
in another forum, unsupported by fact or which does not raise probable cause of
any unprofessional conduct, or which OPC declines to prosecute may be dismissed
by OPC counsel without hearing by a screening panel. OPC counsel shall notify
the complainant of such dismissal stating the reasons therefor.
The
complainant may appeal a dismissal by OPC counsel to the Committee chair within
15 days after notification of the dismissal is mailed.
Upon appeal, the
Committee chair shall conduct a de novo review of the file, either affirm the
dismissal or require OPC counsel to prepare a NOIC, and set the matter for
hearing by a screening panel. In the event of the chair's recusal, the chair
shall appoint the vice chair or one of the screening panel chairs to review and
determine the appeal.
(b) Proceedings before Committee and screening panels.
(b)(1) Review and investigation.
A screening panel shall review all informal
complaints referred to it by OPC counsel, including all the facts developed by
the
informal
complaint,
answer,
investigation
and
hearing,
and the
recommendations of OPC counsel.
(b)(2) Respondent's
appearance.
Before any action is taken which may result in
the recommendation of an admonition or the filing of a formal complaint, the
screening panel shall, upon at least 14 days notice, afford the respondent an
opportunity to appear before the screening panel and testify under oath,
together with any witnesses called by the respondent, and to present an oral
argument with respect to the informal complaint.
All testimony shall be
recorded and preserved so long as proceedings are pending, and in any event,
not less than six months following the hearing.
A written brief may also be
submitted to the screening panel by the respondent. The brief shall not exceed
five pages in length unless permission for enlargement is extended by the chair
or the chair's delegate for good cause shown.
A copy of the brief shall be
forwarded by OPC counsel to the complainant.
(b)(3) Complainant's
appearance.
A complainant shall have the right to appear
before the screening panel personally and testify under oath, together with any
witnesses called by the complainant, with respect to the informal complaint or
in opposition to the matters presented by the respondent. The complainant may
be represented by counsel or some other representative.
(b)(4) Right
to hear evidence.
The complainant and the respondent shall each
have the right to be present during the presentation of the evidence unless
excluded by the screening panel chair for good cause shown.
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(b)(5) Screening
panel
determination.
Upon review of all the facts developed
by the informal complaint, answer, investigation and hearing, the screening
panel, in behalf of the Committee, shall make one of the following
determinations:
(b)(5)(A) that the informal complaint does not raise facts in which there is
probable cause to believe that the respondent was engaged in unprofessional
conduct, in which case, the informal complaint shall be dismissed. OPC counsel
shall promptly give notice of such dismissal by regular mail to the complainant
and the respondent; or
(b)(5)(B) that a letter of caution may be issued. The letter shall be signed
by OPC counsel or the screening panel chair and shall serve as a guide for the
future conduct of the respondent. Thereupon, the informal complaint shall be
dismissed, with the complainant and the respondent being notified of the
dismissal.
The complainant shall also be confidentially notified of the
caution; or
(b)(5)(C) that a dismissal may be conditioned upon the performance by the
respondent of specified conduct which the Committee determines to be warranted
by the facts and the Rules of Professional Conduct; or
(b)(5)(D) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair with
an accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent be
admonished. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and shall
state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and the
basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the respondent should be admonished.
A copy of such screening
panel recommendation shall be served upon the respondent prior to delivery of
the recommendation to the Committee chair.
The Committee chair shall enter an
order admonishing the respondent if no exception has been filed within ten days
of notice of the recommendation being provided to the respondent; or
(b)(5)(E) that the informal complaint be referred to the Committee chair with
an accompanying screening panel recommendation that the respondent receive a
public reprimand. Such screening panel recommendation shall be in writing and
shall state the substance and nature of the informal complaint and defenses and
the basis upon which the screening panel has concluded, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the respondent should receive a public reprimand. A copy of
such screening panel recommendation shall be served upon the respondent prior
to the delivery of the recommendation to the Committee chair. The Committee
chair shall enter an order publicly reprimanding the respondent if no exception
has been filed within ten days of notice of the recommendation being provided
to the respondent; or
(b)(5)(F) that a formal complaint be filed against the respondent.
(b)(6) Determination
of appropriate
sanction.
In determining an appropriate
sanction and only after having found unethical conduct, the screening panel may
consider any admonitions or greater discipline imposed upon the respondent
within the five years immediately preceding the alleged offense.
(b)(7) Continuance
of disciplinary
proceedings.
A disciplinary proceeding may
be held in abeyance by the Committee prior to the filing of a formal complaint
when the allegations or the informal complaint contain matters of substantial
similarity to the material allegations of pending criminal or civil litigation
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in which the respondent is involved.
(c) Exceptions to admonitions and public reprimands.
Within ten days after
notice of the recommendation of an admonition or public reprimand to the
Committee chair, the respondent may file with the Committee chair an exception
to the recommendation and may also, if desired, request a hearing.
If a
request for a hearing is made, the Committee chair, or a screening panel chair
designated by the Committee chair, shall proceed to hear the matter in an
expeditious manner, with OPC counsel and the respondent having the opportunity
to be present. The complainant's testimony may be read into the record. The
complainant need not appear personally unless called by the respondent as an
adverse witness for purposes of cross-examination. The respondent shall have
the burden of proof of showing that the recommendation is unreasonable,
unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious and otherwise
clearly erroneous.
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UT R BAR LWYR DISC AND DISAB Rule 14-511
UT Lawyer Discipline and Disability Rule 14-511
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
PART II. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
CHAPTER 14. RULES GOVERNING THE UTAH STATE BAR
ARTICLE 5. LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY
-•RULE 14-511. PROCEEDINGS SUBSEQUENT TO FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE
(a) Commencement of action.
If the screening panel finds probable cause to
believe that there are grounds for public discipline and that a formal
complaint is merited, OPC counsel shall prepare and file with the district
court a formal complaint setting forth in plain and concise language the facts
upon which the charge of unprofessional conduct is based and the applicable
provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The formal complaint shall be
signed by the Committee chair or, in the chair's absence, by the Committee vice
chair or a screening panel chair designated by the Committee chair.
(b) Venue.
The action shall be brought and the trial shall be held in the
county in which an alleged offense occurred or in the county where the
respondent resides or practices law or last practiced law in Utah; provided,
however, that if the respondent is not a resident of Utah and the alleged
offense is not committed in Utah, the trial shall be held in a county
designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
The parties may
stipulate to a change of venue in accordance with applicable law (currently
Utah Code section 78-13-9).
(c) Style of proceedings.
All proceedings instituted by the OPC shall be
styled "In the Matter of the Discipline of (name of respondent and respondent's
Bar number), Respondent."
(d) Change of judge as a matter of right.
(d)(1) Notice of change.
The respondent or OPC counsel may, by filing a notice
indicating the name of the assigned judge, the date on which the formal
complaint was filed, and that a good faith effort has been made to serve all
parties, change the judge assigned to the case. The notice shall not specify
any reason for the change of judge. The party filing the notice shall send a
copy of the notice to the assigned judge and to the presiding judge. The party
filing the notice may request reassignment to another district court judge from
the same district, which request shall be granted.
Under no circumstances
shall more than one change of judge be allowed to each party under this rule.
(d)(2)
notice
to the
timely

Time.
Unless extended by the court upon a showing of good cause, the
must be filed within 30 days after commencement of the action or prior
notice of trial setting, whichever occurs first.
Failure to file a
notice precludes any change of judge under this rule.

(d)(3) Assignment
of action.
Upon the filing of a notice of change, the
assigned judge shall take no further action in the case. The presiding judge
shall promptly determine whether the notice is proper and, if so, shall
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reassign the action. If the presiding judge is also the assigned judge, the
clerk shall promptly send the notice to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
who shall determine whether the notice is proper and, if so, shall reassign the
action.
(d)(4) .Rule 63 and Rule 63A unaffected.
This rule does not affect any rights a
party may have pursuant to Rule 63 or Rule 63A of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
(e) Actions tried to the bench; findings and conclusions. All actions tried
according to this article shall be tried to the bench, and the district court
shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Neither masters nor
commissioners shall be utilized.
(f) Sanctions hearing. Upon a finding of misconduct and as soon as reasonably
practicable, within a target date of not more than 30 days after the district
court enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law, it shall hold a
hearing to receive relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation, and shall
within five days thereafter, enter an order sanctioning the respondent. Upon
reasonable notice to the parties, the court, at its discretion, may hold the
sanctions hearing immediately after the misconduct proceeding.
(g) Review. Any discipline order by the district court may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court through a petition for review pursuant to the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
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UT R BAR LWYR DISC AND DISAB Rule 14-513
UT Lawyer Discipline and Disability Rule 14-513
WEST'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
PART II. SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
CHAPTER 14. RULES GOVERNING THE UTAH STATE BAR
ARTICLE 5. LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY
-+RULE 14-513. IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL SUITS
Participants in proceedings conducted under this article shall be entitled to
the same protections for statements made in the course of the proceedings as
participants in judicial proceedings. The district courts, Committee members,
special counsel appointed pursuant to Rule 14-517(f), supervising attorneys
engaged in pro bono assistance, trustees appointed pursuant to Rule 14-52 7, and
OPC counsel and staff shall be immune from suit, except as provided in Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 65A and 65B, for any conduct committed in the course
of their official duties, including the investigatory stage.
There is no
immunity from civil suit for intentional misconduct.
Current
2006

with

amendments

effective

November

1,

Copr © 2006 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

7web2.westlawxom/print/printstream.asp

Page 1 of 1

